FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE SPEECH-FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITS

HATE CRIME

LAWS THAT

PUNISH

ONLY

FIGHTING

WORDS BASED ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS OR GENDER ANIMUSR.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
Responding to a significant increase in reported crimes motivated by racism and other bias,' many legislatures and public
universities have enacted anti-hate laws and speech codes proscribing bias-motivated violence and intimidation.2 Many of
I See Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 702, 797, and S. 2000 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
20 (1988) (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum) (noting that the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith conducted a study on the growing number of hate
crimes and found 3000 such crimes between 1980 and 1986, and that the number
of hate crimes in the three year period 1985-1988 exceeded the number of crimes
committed between 1968-1985); Brief for Amicus Curiae, The Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith at 4, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No.
90-7675) [hereinafter Brief for Anti-Defamation League] (reporting a significant
increase in anti-semitic incidents, from 377 in 1980 to 1,685 in 1990); An Outbreak of
Bigotry, TIME, May 28, 1990, at 35 (reporting the rise of bigotry throughout the
world); MICHAEL NEWTON & JUDY A. NEWTON, RACIAL & RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA xiii (1991) ("The past two decades have been characterized by some analysts as the era of the 'crazies,' typified by the explosion of random homicidal violence, serial and mass murderers, the emergence of bizarre political splinter groups
and murderous cults.").
Bias-motivated violence has been defined as:
"[An act or a threatened or attempted act of intimidation, harassment or physical force directed against any person, or group, or their
property or advocate, motivated either in whole or in part by hostility
to their real or perceived race, ethnic background, national origin,
religious belief, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation, with the intention of deterring the free exercise or enjoyment of any rights or
privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States
or the State of New York whether or not performed under color of
law."

Virginia N. Lee, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts Expeience and Beyond, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287, 288 (1990) (quoting Governor's
Task Force on Bias-Related Violence, State of New York, Final Report 2 (1988)).
For an excellent analysis of the physical and psychological effects of hate
crimes see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, And Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135-49 (1982) (documenting the harmful effects of bias-motivated violence and the need for a tort
remedy for such conduct).
Recently, commentators have argued that racist speech should not be a category of expression protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2380-81 (1989) (advocating the regulation of racist speech); Charles R. Lawrence,
III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,
436-37 (1990) (proposing the regulation of hateful speech on university campuses).
2 See Brief for Anti-Defamation League, supra note 1, at 4 & App. A (offering a
detailed list of various government hate crime statutes). An estimated 46 states
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these enactments raise serious First Amendment 3 concerns because they attempt to regulate speech and non-verbal expression
based on content.4
have adopted some form of anti-hate legislation. Id. A variety of measures addressing racial violence have been adopted by these states. See Brief for Amici Curiae, The States of Minnesota, Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Utah at 3, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct.
2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675) (noting that anti-hate laws address this problem in various ways, including prohibiting threatening speech, enhancing penalties for biasmotivated criminal activity, punishing bias-related vandalism, and criminalizing behavior that is inimical to the free exercise of civil rights). In enacting anti-hate laws,
states have expounded compelling reasons to justify such legislation. See, e.g., R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-53-1 (Supp. 1992) (stating "it is the right of every person regardless of race, color, creed, religion, ideological persuasion, or national origin, to be
secure and protected from fear, intimidation and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals").
In response to the increase in bias-motivated violence, Congress also recently
passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which requires the Justice Department to collect and report nationwide data on hate crimes. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(1990) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990 Supp.)).
Similarly, many universities have adopted conduct codes prohibiting or censuring particular forms of expression in response to a resurgence in racial tensions on
college campuses. See Steve France, Hate Goes To College, A.B.A.J.,July 1990, at 44;
Lawrence, supra note 1, at 434. Currently, speech codes are in effect at about 350
colleges and universities. Carol Innerst, Senate Silence Expected on ProposalDefending
Free Speech on Campus, WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A10. Some commentators, however, question the constitutionality of such codes because they attempt
to regulate the content of expression. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 569-70 (1990) (criticizing
the regulation of speech on American campuses); DINESH D'SOuzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 156 (1992) (noting that "the
efforts of . . .schools to regulate and enforce a social etiquette have created an
enormous artificiality of discourse among peers, and thus have become an obstacle
to that true openness that seems to be the sure footing for equality").
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Since 1925, the Supreme Court has declared that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected freedom of expression from state infringement. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). For an analysis of the political and social reasons behind
the right of free speech, see COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, 1791-1991: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND 17 (Herbert
M. Atherton &J. Jackson Barlow eds., 1991) (proclaiming the populous must have
the right of free speech because only "informed and involved citizens" can ensure
the survival of the American democratic system); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theoy of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884-85 (1963) (positing that the
suppression of speech prevents healthy action and change).
4 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not pro-
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The United States Supreme Court has historically disdained
laws that regulate expression on the basis of content. 5 The
Court's bias against content-based regulations, however, has not
been absolute.6 Essentially, the Court has developed a number
of categorical exceptions to the general principle of governmental neutrality toward regulating expression.7 These exceptionsobscenity,8 libel, 9 incitement to riot,' 0 fighting words" and comhibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."). The Supreme Court has held that various types of non-verbal
expression constitute protected speech. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S.
Ct. 2404, 2407-08, 2410 (1990) (holding that burning the flag was protected symbolic expression); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 505-06 (1969) (deciding that wearing black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War was protected by the First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 141-42 (1966) (declaring that First Amendment protections "are not confined
to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly
include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be .... ").
For an excellent discussion of symbolic speech, see CarmenJ. DiMaria, Note, State's
ProhibitionAgainst Nude Dancing Is ConstitutionalBecause its Interest in Preserving Societal
Orders and Morals is Both Sufficiently Substantialand Content Neutral, 22 SETON HALL L.
REV. 943, 943-44 (1992) (noting that the Court has long held that not all forms of
expression are safeguarded).
5 See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (asserting that
"[r]egulations which permit the government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (noting that
the "First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulations extends not only to
restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of
an entire topic"); Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (declaring that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content"). For a discussion of content-based regulations see Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a CentralPrinciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 20, 22 (1975).
6 See, e.g., Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1968) (holding that "the exercise of First Amendment rights may be regulated where such exercise will unduly interfere with the normal use of the public property by other
members of the public with an equal right of access to it"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965) (ruling that not all expression is protected under the First
Amendment). See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 2.01, at 2-3 (1984) (stating that [the] absolutist position, whereby any law which
for any reason and in any degree punishes or restricts speech is said to be unconstitutional, has never been accepted by the Supreme Court").
7 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problems."). See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text for further discussion of
these categorical exceptions.
8 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene
materials are outside First Amendment protections); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity was not constitutionally protected).
For a further discussion of other obscenity cases see Mark J. Oberstaedt, Note,
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mercial speechl 2-have been excluded from First Amendment
protection or afforded a lesser degree of protection than other
3
forms of expression, such as political discourse.'
Outside these narrowly-limited categories of speech the
Court has reviewed content-based restrictions with strict scrutiny.' 4 Regulations based upon content will not be permitted
under this standard unless the government demonstrates that the
law in question has been narrowly tailored to meet an overriding
States May ProscribePossession of Non-Obscene Child Pornography,21 SETON HALL L. REV.
410 (1991).
9 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 (1990)
(holding that only defamatory remarks which can be proven false are subject to
state libel law); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that
states could punish false statements about non-public figures); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that public figures must prove that a
defendant acted with "actual malice" to prevail in a defamation suit); Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting libel of a class of citizens). For a thorough discussion of defamation
and the First Amendment see W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1221 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (restating the principle that a state may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (ruling that when a "speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot," such speech was unprotected by the First Amendment). For a defense of the modem clear and present
danger test see Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clearand Present Danger,70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (1982) (stating
that the clear and present danger test is subject to abuse but is still the best method
for regulating "unlawful advocacy").
I1 See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (holding that the First Amendment does
not protect words which by their very utterance tend to incite a violent reaction in
the person to whom they are addressed). See generally JEROME A. BARRON & C.
THOMAS DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 3:2 (1979) (recount-

ing the sources and grounds for the fighting words doctrine). For an in-depth
study of Chaplinsky and the fighting words doctrine see infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986) (noting that the First Amendment provided limited protection to commercial speech that addressed a lawful activity and was neither fraudulent nor misleading); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (declaring that misleading commercial speech is unprotected by the First
Amendment). For a discussion of commercial speech and the First Amendment,
see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.30 (4th ed.
1991); Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.
L. REV. 372 (1979).

13 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (asserting that some expressions are "of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality"). See also supra
notes 7-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of these unprotected categories.
14 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (holding that regulations aimed at
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or compelling governmental interest.' 5 Given the difficulty of
meeting this exacting standard,' 6 many legislators of hate laws
and speech codes have attempted to fit their restrictions within
the fighting words exception. 17
Fighting words have been defined as those individually
inhibiting expression are subject to a more exacting standard of review than regulations related to the suppression of "noncommunicative conduct").
As an alternative to content-based regulation, governmental proscription of
expression may be content neutral and inflict only an indirect burden on free
speech. See Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (holding that "general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech
but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendments forbade Congress or the States to pass
....
.).
In United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court fashioned the most frequently
used test for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute which imposed indirect
burdens on expression. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Court submitted that a
government regulation was sufficiently justified "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377. Cf. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 125-26 (1984) (recommending abolishing the content-based/contentneutral distinction in favor of a "compelling [governmental] interest" analysis each
time the government proscribes expression).
'5 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (stating that "an absolute
prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn
to accomplish a compelling governmental interest"). See generally LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 833 (1988), wherein Professor
Tribe declares:
In order to establish that particular expressive activities are not protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment, the defenders of a regulation
which is aimed at the communicative impact of the expression have
the burden of either coming within one of the narrow categorical exceptions or showing that the regulation is necessary to further a
"compelling interest."
Id.
16 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411-12, 420 (holding that a flag burning statute
designed to prosecute only those acts which are likely to offend an observer was
invalid under strict scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 321, 329 (1988)
(declaring that a statute proscribing the display of disrespectful signs in front of a
foreign embassy failed "the most exacting scrutiny").
17 See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 451 (citing a university speech code regulating
speech and asserting that "[wihen racist speech takes the form of face-to-face insults, catcalls, or other assaultive speech aimed at an individual or small groups of
persons, then it falls within the 'fighting words' exception to [F]irst [A]mendment
protection"). See also Thomas A. Cinti, "Freedom is Slavery ".-The Thought Police Have
Come to America's Campuses, 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 383, 391 (1991) (noting "the
only way for student conduct codes to withstand constitutional attack is to limit
their restrictions to that speech encompassed within either the traditional libel or
fighting words exceptions"). For further discussion of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), and the origin of the fighting words doctrine see supra note 11
and infra notes 18-20, 43-49 and accompanying text.
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targeted insults that are apt to evoke retaliation from the addressee.1 8 Under this definition, fighting words maintain a formal neutrality because regulation is not determined by the
particular message expressed but according to the likelihood of
retaliation by the addressee.' 9
By contrast, anti-hate legislation based upon the fighting
words exception seeks to protect particular groups by outlawing
certain types of expression but not other types.2" This selectivity
raises First Amendment concerns. 2 ' Specifically at issue is
18 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 38 A. 731, 731-32
(1895)). The Chaplinsky Court specifically defined fighting words as those that "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id. at 572 (citation omitted). One commentator has suggested that, according to Chaplinsky, four elements must be present in order to regulate speech under
the fighting words doctrine; these elements are established if the speech
(1) constitutes a personally abusive epithet; (2) [is] addressed in a
face-to-face manner; (3) to a specific individual; and (4) uttered under
such circumstances that the words have a direct tendency to cause an
immediate violent response by the ordinary, reasonable recipient.
Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words And Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q 531, 580 (1980).
That same commentator questioned the validity of the fighting words doctrine. Id.
at 536 (suggesting that the fighting words doctrine has become "nothing more than
a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society
dedicated to the principle of free expression"). See also Thomas F. Shea, "Don't
Bother to Smile When You Call Me That "--FightingWords and the First Amendment, 63 Ky.
L.J. 1, 1-2 (1975) (asserting that the "majority of the United States Supreme Court
has gradually concluded that fighting words, no matter how narrowly defined, are a
protected form of speech").
19 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548-49 (1992) (declaring that
"the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of
the First Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea,
but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary)
mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey"). See also David Cole,
'Hate Speech' is Protected,N.J.L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, supp. at 30 (noting that the obscenity, libel and fighting words classifications "maintain a formal neutrality among the
citizenry, while regulation of racist speech pointedly does not").
20 R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The Court noted that the St. Paul regulation had
"not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression.... Rather it has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial,
gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that
the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas." Id. Moreover,
selectivity in regulating fighting words may be regarded as evidence of the government's hostility towards the specific biases proscribed, as well as an effort to send a
message to bigots that such views are disfavored. See id. at 2550 (noting that "the
only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the
city council's special hostility towards the particular biases they singled out.").
21 Id. The selectivity of the St. Paul statute and the government's declaration of
hostility against bigotry was "precisely what the First Amendment" prohibited. Id.
The government's hostility could be expressed, according to the majority, but not
in a manner that limited the speech of those disagreeing with the government. Id.
See supra notes 3-4 for discussion of the First Amendment's specific concerns.

1993]

NOTE

1073

whether a law can constitutionally prohibit a particular subset of
fighting words while leaving others unregulated. 22
Recently, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 23 the United States
Supreme Court considered the legitimacy of regulating racist expression alleged to be encompassed within the traditional fighting words exception. 24 The R.A. V Court held that while the
government can proscribe fighting words generally, it cannot
25
punish certain fighting words according to their racist content.
In the early morning hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner
R.A.V., 2 6 a 17-year old white male, 2 7 and several other youths,
allegedly burned a wooden cross 28 in the front yard of an Afri-

can-American family's home.29 Upon his arrest, the City of St.
Paul charged R.A.V. with violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance, 0 which prohibited the display of symbols
likely to incite anger or alarm on the basis of a person's race,
22 See Cole, supra note 19, at 15 (posing the question: "If the state may prohibit
all fighting words because they are unprotected, may it prohibit a subset of fighting
words that poses a particularly serious social problem?").
23 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
24 Id. at 2541-42.
25 Id. at 2547-48.
26 Minnesota law protects from disclosure the identity of ajuvenile involved in a
crime. See MINN. STAT. § 260.161 (1992). A recent news article identified R.A.V. as
Robert A. Viktora, an alleged skinhead. John Leo, A Sensible Judgment on Hate, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., July 6, 1992, at 25.
27 Brief for Respondent at 1-2 & n.1, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992) (No. 90-7675) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
28 See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2365-66. Professor Matsuda explained that
"[t]here are certain symbols and regalia that in the context of history carry a clear
message of racial supremacy, hatred, persecution, and degradation of certain
groups. The swastika, the Klan robes, the burning cross are examples ...... Id.
29 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992). The victims, Russell
and Laura Jones and their five children, were the only African-American family living in R.A.V.'s immediate neighborhood. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at
3; Tom Hamburger, Court Hears St. Paul Hate-Crimes Case; Cross Burner Has Challenged
Law's Constitutionality, STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 5, 1991, at 7A. Prior to the cross burning, the Joneses had suffered other forms of harassment that included vandalism
and name-calling. Respondent's Brief, supra note 27, at 3. According to the respondent's brief, R.A.V. was one of the central instigators in the cross burning. Id.
at 2. The next day, R.A.V. allegedly admitted and bragged about his involvement
in the incident. Id. at 4.
30 See R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990)). R.A.V. was one of the first people to be charged under the law. See
Hamburger, supra note 29, at 7A. R.A.V. was also charged with racially motivated
assault under MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4) (Supp. 1993). R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541
n.2. Additionally, petitioner's conduct may have violated other Minnesota statutes.
Id. at 2541 n.1 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.595 (1987 & Supp. 1993) (criminal damage to property); MINN. STAT. § 609.713(1) (1987 & Supp. 1993) (terroristic
threats); MINN. STAT. § 609.563 (1987) (arson)).
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religion or gender.3 1
R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the
3 2
ordinance violated the First Amendment, as it was overbroad
and impermissibly content-based. 3 The trial court granted
R.A.V.'s motion. 4 St. Paul appealed, arguing that the ordinance
could be narrowly interpreted to reach only conduct not protected by the First Amendment.3 5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed and unanimously upheld the ordinance, stating
that the ordinance prohibited
only expressive conduct that con36
stitutes fighting words.
31 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990)). The St. Paul ordinance specifically stated:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Id. (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). The ordinance carried
a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail. See Linda Greenhouse,justices Weigh Ban on
Voicing Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at B19, col. 1. The St. Paul ordinance is
similar to legislation in an estimated forty-six states. Marcia Coyle, Hate Laws Scrutinized by Justices; Are Social Goals and the Constitution at Odds?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 1991,
at 1.
32 R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541. A statute regulating speech is overbroad when it
applies to both protected and unprotected expression. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985). Under the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, a party may attack the validity of an overbroad law even if that party's own
conduct is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 503. This is allowed because an overbroad statute "also threatens others not before the court-those who
desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so
rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid." Id. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972) (asserting that "the crucial question . . . is whether the ordinance sweeps within its
prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). An overbroad statute will not be voided unless the statute's overbreadth
is substantial and the statute cannot be narrowed to reach only unprotected speech.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (noting that invalidation
under the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," to be applied "sparingly and
only as a last resort").
For an additional discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see Comment, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
33 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. In reply papers and at argument St. Paul conceded
that the ordinance regulated expressive conduct. Brief for Petitioner at 3, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675) [hereinafter Petitioner's
Brief].
34 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
35 In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom., R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
36 Id. at 510-11. Alternatively, the Minnesota Supreme Court construed the statute as limited to conduct that tended to incite "imminent lawless action." Id. at 510
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 7 to determine whether the ordinance censored expressive conduct in
violation of the First Amendment. 38 Despite thejudiciary's traditional refusal to protect fighting words, the majority held that the
First Amendment prohibited laws that selectively proscribe fighting words based upon their racist content. 39 Accordingly, the
majority declared the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutional because it prohibited only fighting words that communicated racial,
religious or gender animus, while leaving other invective
unregulated.40
Although the First Amendment prevents the government
from abridging the freedom of speech,4 ' the Court has often recognized that the right of free speech is not absolute.4 2 In Chaplin(quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). The Minnesota high
court also decided that "the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means towards accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against
bias-motivated threats to public safety and order... and therefore is not prohibited
by the [F]irst [A]mendment." Id. at 511 (citing Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)).
For a discussion of the history and application of the clear and present danger
doctrine, see DAVID S. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 31-42 (1984). See also supra note 10.
37 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Ill S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
38 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541-42 (1992).
39 Id. at 2542-43, 2545, 2547, 2550. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court and was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Souter and
Thomas. Id. at 2541. Historically, the Supreme Court has viewed content-based
regulations as presumptively invalid. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991) (declaring that the First
Amendment forbade the government from imposing a financial burden on speakers
on the basis of the content of their message); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (holding that government could not suppress the discussion of controversial issues by a government utility, unless the suppression was necessary to advance an overriding policy interest); Police Dept. of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited the government from regulating picketing on the basis of content).
40 Id. at 2547. The Court noted that the "unmodified terms" of the statute,
prohibiting expression "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender," indicated that the law prohibited only fighting words that were based on racial, religious or other biases. Id. at 2547. The Court added that the language permitted
"[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe.., unless
they [were] addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics." Id. Therefore,
according to the Court, the law allowed hate crimes or fighting words aimed at, for
example, homosexuals. Id.
41 See supra note 3 for the text of and commentary on the First Amendment.
42 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 2-3 (noting that absolute protection of speech
has never been adopted by the courts). See Cal M. Logue, Free Speech: The Philosophical Poles, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: SELECTED ESSAYS FROM THE
JOURNALS OF THE SPEECH COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATION 70 (Thomas L. Tedford et
al. eds., 1987), for a philosophical perspective on the scope of the First Amend-

1076

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1067

sky v. New Hampshire,4" the Supreme Court declared that "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" were
outside constitutional protection.4 4 Chaplinsky was convicted of
violating a state statute that prohibited offensive or derisive
name-calling in a public place.4 5 Chaplinsky was arrested after he
became abusive and called the city marshall a "God damned
' 46
racketeer" and a "damned fascist.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Murphy held that
Chaplinsky's utterances constituted fighting words, one of several categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment.4 7
The Justice singled out fighting words as unprotected for their
failure to promote ideas and their tendency to cause injury and
evoke violence. 48 Applying this principle to the New Hampshire
ment. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (articulating that
"[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' "). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing content-based regulation of speech permitted by the Court).
43 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
44 Id. at 571-72. The Court enumerated that these unprotected categories included "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those by which their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572. See also supra notes 7-13 (discussing
these exceptions to speech protection).
45 Id. The New Hampshire statute specifically stated:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or
exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend
or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation.
Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 569-70. Chaplinsky had been addressing a crowd on a public street
when a disturbance occurred. Id. Upon being led away by a traffic officer, Chaplinsky hurled insults at the city marshall. Id. at 570.
47 Id. at 572. See also supra notes 7-13, 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of these categories. The New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted the statute as prohibiting only expression that has a "direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." Id. at 573
(citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court agreed, noting that the statute was "narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying
within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a
breach of the peace." Id. Thus, the statute required only a danger that the addressee would be incited to violence, not proof of actual violence between Chaplinsky and the marshall. See id. For a further discussion of Chaplinsky, see Gard, supra
note 18, at 531-34 and Shea, supra note 18, at 8-10.
48 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Court explained that "[i]t has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.
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statute, the Court upheld the statute, finding that it prohibited
only expression likely to cause a breach of the peace and not
other protected speech.49
The Court subsequently modified the fighting words exception in Terminiello v. Chicago.5" Terminiello was convicted of
breaching the peace following a race-baiting speech he delivered
before a large crowd. 5 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
reversed Terminiello's conviction on the ground that the ordinance under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally
overbroad.52 TheJustice explained that the trial court's interpretation of the ordinance permitted convictions not only for fighting words, but also for speech that antagonized the audience or
created strife.53 Justice Douglas asserted that, absent a "clear
and present danger" of violence, the First Amendment protected
speech arousing anger in listeners.54
49 Id. at 573. Justice Murphy argued that Chaplinsky's utterances were without
communicative value because "[airgument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the
appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." Id. at
574. Some commentators have suggested that the fighting words doctrine is no
longer good law. See supra note 18.
50 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
51 Id. at 3. In response to the speech, a protest group outside grew rowdy, id,
and Terminiello proceeded to denounce them as "snakes" and "slimy scum," Id.at
26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 5. Terminiello was charged with violating a Chicago city ordinance
which stated:
All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any
improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion
tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of the city ... shall
be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be severally fined not less than one dollar nor more than two
hundred dollars for each offense.
Id. at 2 n.l (citation omitted).
Adopting the rationale of an earlier Supreme Court opinion, Justice Douglas
explained the fatal flaw of an overbroad statute: "For all anyone knows [Terminiello] was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for
example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition
of unrest." Id. at 5-6 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)). Justice
Douglas reasoned that it was improper to sustain a conviction where "one part of
the statute was unconstitutional and it could not be determined that the defendant
was not convicted under that part." Id.
53 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. The Court declared the statute overbroad, opining
that:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Id.
54 Id. at 4-5. Acknowledging that a certain level of provocative speech was con-
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Employing this principle to uphold a conviction, the Court,
in Feiner v. New York, 55 held that a speaker inciting his audience to
violence could be punished if a "clear and present danger" of
violence existed.56 Irving Feiner, a college student, was arrested
after delivering a street-corner speech in which he denounced
President Truman as a "bum" and called on African-Americans
to "rise up in arms and fight for their rights." '57 Justice Vinson,
58

writing for the Court, found that Feiner's conduct incited a riot.

The Justice asserted that Feiner's arrest was not motivated by a
desire to censor his speech, but was a legitimate effort by the
state to prevent violence and preserve the peace. 59 The Court
stitutionally protected, the Court's decision indicated a retreat from the broad implications of Chaplinsky. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.39, at 1059
("Decisions following Chaplinsky reflect the Court's desire to limit the broad implications of the doctrine outlined there and the recognition of the potential social
value in the statements that might come under the initial definition of 'fighting
words.' "). In the wake of Terminiello, numerous cases indicate an effort by the
Court to limit the scope of the fighting words doctrine on the basis of overbreadth
or vagueness rather than reviewing the constitutionality of the speech itself. See,
e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987) (holding unconstitutionally overboard an ordinance prohibiting all speech that in any manner interrupts a
police officer); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131-32 (1974) (invalidating an ordinance that sanctioned "opprobrious language" not construed by the
Court to be fighting words); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (holding
unconstitutional a statute primarily because there was no danger of retaliation by
the addressee). For an additional discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra
note 32.
Under the related void for vagueness doctrine, a statute is held to be unconstitutional if it fails to fully inform the public as to what speech or conduct is prohibited. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that the First
Amendment void for vagueness doctrine demanded that a criminal statute "define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage discriminatory enforcement"). For a further discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine
see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.9.
55 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
56 Id. at 320 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).
57 Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Feiner's words caused the crowd to grow
angry, and he was subsequently arrested for disorderly conduct when he failed to
heed a police officer's request to stop speaking. Id. at 317-18. Unlike Chaplinsky,
Feiner did not involve a face-to-face confrontation likely to provoke a particular addressee to violence; thus, a pure fighting words issue was not presented. Shea,
supra note 18, at 10-11.
58 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320-21. ChiefJustice Vinson articulated:
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument
for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when
as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and
undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach
of the peace.
Id. at 321.
59 Id. at 320-2 1. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black argued that the police must
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therefore upheld Feiner's conviction.60
Returning to the narrow view propounded in Terminiello, the
Supreme Court in Street v. New York 6 held that expression which
angered an audience, without danger of violence, was protected
by the First Amendment.6" Defendant Street, upset about the
shooting of a civil rights activist, burned an American flag in public while exclaiming, "We don't need no damn flag." 63 He was
convicted under a statute that prohibited publicly mutilating or
first attempt to calm a restless audience before infringing upon a speaker's First
Amendment rights. Id. at 326-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 320-21. One commentator has summarized the status of the fighting
words doctrine in light of Feiner as follows:
(1) expressions of opinion or belief, no matter how unorthodox or
hateful to the speaker's audience, were constitutionally protected and
could not be punished; (2) encouraging an audience to lawless action
against others was also protected unless there existed a clear and
present danger that the action would in fact occur; and (3) fighting
words, a form of unprotected speech, could be punished under a statute narrowly interpreted to forbid face to face personal insults likely
to cause the average person to react violently, whether or not the actual addressee was likely to so react.
Shea, supra note 18, at 11.
Subsequent cases have significantly undercut Feiner's authority by applying the
"clear and present danger" language of Terminiello. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (refusing to classify as fighting words the singing of
religious and patriotic songs by civil rights demonstrators). For an additional discussion of Feiner, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.39.

Scholars have levied criticism against Feiner, arguing that the decision grants a
"heckler's veto" to an audience insofar as the Court seemed to place no duty on the
police to first attempt to quell an agitated crowd; if listeners do not agree with a
speaker's views, they may exhibit hostility in order to have the speaker silenced by
authorities. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.39 ("By immediately
acquiescing in the face of a single threat by one individual, the police had acted
merely as conduits for the desires of suppression and denied the provocation value
attributed to speech in Terminiello, regardless of the impetus that motivated the
policemen.").
61 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
62 Id. at 592-94. For nearly fifty years, the Court has continued to reaffirm
Chaplinsky's validity. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.40, at 1062. In
Chaplinsky, fighting words were defined not only as those which tend to "incite an
immediate breach of the peace" but also those which "inflict injury." Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Court has, however, yet to uphold
a conviction under the "inflicts injury" component. Victoria L. Handler, Legislating
Social Tolerance: Hate Crimes and the First Amendment, 13 HAM. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137,
146 (1992) (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1986); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1964); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948)). In fact, the Supreme
Court has not defined what type of injury is needed to satisfy this aspect of Chaplinsky. Id.
63 Street, 394 U.S. at 578-79.
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defiling any United States flag by word or deed." Justice Harlan,
penning the majority opinion, reversed the conviction, positing
that expressions were protected by the First Amendment even if
those expressions were offensive or counter to societal values. 65
The Justice concluded that although Street's conduct was offensive, it did not constitute fighting words within the meaning of
Chaplinsky.6 6 The Court noted that unlike the conduct in Feiner,
no danger of retaliation existed, nor did Street's conduct seek to
67
incite others to riot.
In Cohen v. California,68 the Court further narrowed the fighting words doctrine by holding that offensive speech alone did not
constitute fighting words. 6 9 In the corridor of a courthouse,
where women and children were present, Cohen wore a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft."' 7° Cohen was convicted
under a statute that prohibited disturbing the peace by offensive
conduct. 7 '
Reversing Cohen's conviction, the Court indicated that the
state lacked the power to prosecute Cohen for the content of his
message, because there was no showing of intent to incite violence or to disrupt the draft.7 2 Justice Harlan posited that offensive expression had an emotive value that should not be
suppressed.73 Moreover, the Court noted that the fighting words
doctrine was not applicable because Cohen's words were not diId. at 577-78 (citation omitted).
Id. at 577, 592.
66 Id. at 592.
67 Id. at 592. Justice Harlan specifically averred: "[Wie cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of
'fighting words' which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace.' " Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
68 403 U.S. 15 (1971). For a discussion of Cohen see William Cohen, A Look Back
at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1595 (1987); Gard, supra note 18, at 563.
69 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26.
70 Id. at 16.
71 Id. (citation omitted).
72 Id. at 18.
73 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. The Justice stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours ....
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often
appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary
side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open
debate permits us to achieve.
64

65
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rected toward an individual."4 Finally, the majority rejected the
state's contention that government could prohibit offensive
speech, like Cohen's, that was cast upon unwilling listeners, even
though the expression neither consituted fighting words nor was
likely to cause actual violence.75 After Cohen, therefore, offensive
speech in general was deemed to be protected expression, while
fighting words remained unprotected.7 6
The Court altered the fighting words doctrine in Gooding v.
Wilson,7 7 by adopting a subjective (rather than objective) person
standard to determine the likelihood of retaliation by an addressee.7 8 The defendant in Gooding was convicted for using opprobrious and abusive language when the police tried to remove
him and other anti-war demonstrators from the entrance to an
army induction center. 79 Relying on the overbreadth doctrine,
the Court found that the statute was not sufficiently narrow as it
applied to more than fighting words likely to incite acts of violence by the actual addressee.8 ° The Court's holding deviated
74 Id. at 20. Additionally, the Court found Cohen's jacket did not constitute obscenity, as the expression was not erotic. Id.
75 Id. at 21-22. Justice Harlan narrowly construed what constitutes a captive audience stating" 'we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.' " Id. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728, 738 (1970)). TheJustice maintained, nonetheless, that those in the courtroom could have avoided Cohen's display "simply by averting their eyes." Id. Finally, Justice Harlan suggested that offensive speech merits the same protection
afforded other speech because "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25.
76 See id. at 26; Shea, supra note 18, at 13. In reaffirming the fighting words
doctrine, the Cohen Court asserted:
[T]he States are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration
of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called "fighting words,"
those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely
to provoke violent reaction.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. For an additional discussion of Cohen, see NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.39, at 1061.
77 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
78 See Shea, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that "[s]urprisingly, the Court found the
law overbroad because the statutory language did not go on to explain that the
prohibition was limited to (a) fighting words that were (b) likely to cause acts of
violence by the actual addressee").
79 Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-20 & n.l. In response to a policeman's attempt to
remove him, Wilson specifically stated " 'White son of a bitch, I'll kill you,' " and
" 'You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death.' " Id. at 520 n. 1. To another officer
he said, " 'You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all
to pieces.' " Id.
80 Id. at 525. The statute under which Wilson was charged provided:
Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and
in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending
to cause a breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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from the precedent set in Chaplinsky, where the Court had defined
fighting words not in terms of what a particular addressee
thought, but rather on the basis of the likelihood of retaliation by
an average addressee."' In effect, the Court narrowed the fighting words doctrine by requiring a clear and present danger of
violence by the actual addressee.8 2
Despite the continual reaffirmation of the fighting words exception, 83 the Supreme Court has declined to uphold any convictions for fighting words since Chaplinsky.8 4 The Court has set
aside convictions both by narrowing the definition of fighting
words and by employing the overbreadth doctrine. 5 Although
the Court could have used either of these devices to strike down
a hate speech ordinance founded on the fighting words exception, the Court instead used the principle of "content neutrality"
to invalidate such an ordinance in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul. 6
Id. at 519 (citation omitted). The Court determined that this "broad standard effectively 'licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case.' " Id. at 528
(quoting Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)). See also Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (stating that forbidding the use of" 'opprobrious language,' " proscribed language that did not "inflict injury" or "incite an
immediate breach of the peace").
81 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). Contrasting
Chaplinsky with Gooding, one commentator has observed that "when the Chaplinsky
Court determined that fighting words were unprotected, it held that as a result they
could be punished irrespective of a clear and present danger that the actual addressee would become violent." See Shea, supra note 18, at 15.
82 Shea, supra note 18, at 15. Summarizing Gooding, Professor Shea noted that
the Court "found that an essential defect in the statute, as interpreted by the Georgia courts, was a failure to require the likelihood of a violent reaction on the part of
the actual addressee." Id. Dissenting in Gooding, Justice Blackmun stated that the
Court was "merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky." Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Post-Goodingcases continue to illustrate the Court's reluctance to affirm a prosecution for the use of fighting words. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.40
(noting that courts have not "look[ed] with favor on prosecutions for 'fighting
words.' "). Instead, the Court has employed the overbreadth doctrine to avoid upholding convictions. Id. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the overbreadth doctrine.
83 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.40.
84 See supra note 82; see also David Cole, supra note 19, supp. at 15 ("this category
[of fighting words] is so narrow as to be in truth almost academic-so narrow that
the Court has not upheld a single conviction for fighting words since the category
was created in 1942"). Although Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), is arguably an exception to this claim, Feiner did not present a pure fighting words issue.
See supra note 57.
85 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.40. See supra notes 57-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's narrowing of the fighting words doctrine, and supra note 32 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.
86 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). The Court explained that although petitioner
R.A.V. argued in favor of the overbreadth doctrine, the Court found addressing the
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The R.A. V Court considered whether government has an
obligation to ensure content neutrality in its regulation of fighting words or any other unprotected category of expression.8 7
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began by accepting the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the anti-hate ordinance as regulating only expression which constituted fighting
words. 8 Declining to engage in an overbreadth analysis, 9 the
Justice summarily declared the ordinance facially unconstitutional because it regulated expression according to its subject
matter. 90
The majority asserted that the government generally can not
proscribe speech or non-verbal expression based on its content,
and that such regulations were presumptively invalid. 9 ' The
Court nevertheless acknowledged that content-based regulations
were permitted for certain categories of speech that were of
" 'slight social value.' "92 The majority rejected, however, the
contention that such categories were completely outside First
Amendment protection.9" Speech within these limited areas, Justice Scalia asserted, could not be made the avenue for content
discrimination even though the speech had generally been classified as unprotected.9 4 Exemplifying this assertion, the Court
doctrine to be "unnecessary" because the statute unconstitutionally prohibited
otherwise protected speech based on content. Id.
87 Id. at 2544, 2547. See Cole, supra note 19, at 98-99.
88 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
89 Id. See supra note 32 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.
90 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
91 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980);
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940)).
92 Id. at 2542-43 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)). Although recent decisions have limited the scope of categories such as
obscenity and defamation, the Court maintained that a categorical approach is still
a vital part of First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). For a discussion of the obscenity and defamation categories, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
93 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543. Justice Scalia asserted that previous Court statements proclaiming that certain categories of speech are unprotected by the First
Amendment "must be taken in context" and were not literally true. Id. (citations
omitted). Justice White, in his concurrence, chastised the Court for this assertion,
professing that "those statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical
approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at
2552 (White, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 2543. Specifically, the Court declared that types of speech within these
limited areas may be regulated "because of their constitutionallyproscribable content (ob-
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noted that while the government could proscribe all libel, it
could not proscribe only libel against the government.9 5
Justice Scalia next rejected Justice White's contention,
voiced in a concurrence, that the government could freely regulate proscribable speech.9 6 The Court postulated that limiting
the government's ability to proscribe speech on the basis of one
element and not another was common to First Amendment jurisprudence. 97 Justice Scalia averred that the Court had consistently held, for example, that some non-verbal expression could
be prohibited because of the danger of the activity involved, but
not because of the idea expressed.9 8 The key, the majority
stressed, was that the government could not regulate the underlying message or viewpoint of an expression. 99
The majority asserted that this reasoning did not compel the
government to regulate all proscribable speech, as the concurrence suggested, but required the government to utilize a conscenity, defamation, etc.)-not [because] they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." Id.
95 Id.

96 Id. (citing id. at 2550-60 (White, J., concurring)). IfJustice White's contention
were true, the majority opined, government could prohibit obscenity which was
unfavorable to it. Id. Justice Scalia declared that "[s]uch a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at odds with common sense
and with our jurisprudence as well." Id. For a discussion ofJustice White's concurring opinion, see infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
97 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544. For example, the Court stated that proscribing
obscenity but not governmental criticism was accepted practice. Id.
98 Id. The Court bolstered this claim by referencing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 406-07 (1989), and noting that "burning a flag in violation of an ordinance
against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an
ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not." R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2544. The
Justice similarly observed that time, place and manner restrictions permit government regulation of particular speech on the basis of a non-content element but not
on the basis of content. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)). For an analysis of what constitutes a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction see NOWAK & ROTUNDA,supra note 12, § 16.47. See also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (holding
constitutional a state fair rule requiring all leafletting to be done from a licensed
booth); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972) (upholding a statute
prohibiting noisy disturbances near schools that are in session); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding the right of a municipality to require
parade permits).
The R.A. V Court also propounded that the power to regulate on the basis of a
non-content element does not give the government the authority to proscribe expression on the basis of content. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544.
99 Id. at 2545. The Court stated: "The government may not regulate use based
on hostility-or favortism-towards the underlying message expressed." Id.
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tent-neutral approach to the regulation of such expression. 0 0
The Court conceded that the prohibition against content discrimination was not absolute.' 0 '
Justice Scalia outlined three exceptions to the government's
obligation to exercise content neutrality when regulating proscribable expression. 10 2 The Justice first indicated that discrimination on the basis of content was permissible when the intention
was to prohibit the worst kinds of unprotected speech, such as
the most vulgar obscenity. 10 3 The Court then noted that a content-based regulation of a subclass of proscribable speech could
be justified if directed at the secondary effects of proscribable
speech.' °4 Finally, the Court stated that totally proscribable
speech could be subject to content-based discrimination0 in
the
5
absense of any suspicion of official suppression of ideas.
Using the aforementioned principles, the majority held that
the municipal ordinance was clearly unconstitutional even as nar100 Id. The concurrences called the majority's approach one of underinclusiveness. Id. Addressing these assertions,Justice Scalia defined underinclusiveness "as
a First Amendment 'absolutism' whereby 'within a particular 'proscribable' category of expression .. .a government must either proscribe all speech or no speech
at all." Id. (citing id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
In support of the conclusion that government was not bound to regulate all
proscribable speech, the majority posited that a state could selectively regulate
proscribable expression in specific media, for example, because it would not be
upon the basis of content. Id. Justice Scalia averred that such a regulation,
although underinclusive, would be content neutral and thus constitutional. Id. (citing Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-26 (1989)). In Sable, the
Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting only telephone communications that
were obscene. Id.
101 Id. Justice Scalia also stressed that the prohibition against content discrimination applied differently to proscribable speech than to fully protected speech. Id.
102 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545-46.
103 Id. For example, the majority explained that a government could ban only
"obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience." Id. at 2546. The
Court noted, however, that the government could not proscribe "only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages." Id. (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 2546 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
In Renton, the Court held constitutional the regulation of the location of adult theaters by concentrating or dispersing them because such regulation was aimed at the
secondary effects of such theaters. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. To illustrate further
valid discrimination based on content, the R.A. V majority opined that a state could
proscribe only obscene live performances involving minors. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at
2546.
For a discussion of Renton, see Lisa Yoshida, Note, The Role of "Secondary Effects"
in First Amendment Analysis: Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 161,
163 (1987) (noting that laws which regulate speech based upon non-content factors
do not ordinarily raise First Amendment concerns).
105 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
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rowly interpreted by the Minnesota high court.'° 6 The ordinance
discriminated on the basis of content, the Court concluded, by
proscribing only fighting words arising from racial, religious or
gender bigotry. 10 7 The majority averred that the First Amendment did not permit a government to single out particular fighting words on the basis of their unpopular subject matter.'
Furthermore, the Court found that the ordinance, in its "practical operation," went beyond content discrimination and constituted actual viewpoint discrimination. 0 9 The ordinance, Justice
Scalia emphasized, criminalized the expression of certain invective but left unregulated other equally violent or hateful fighting
words that expressed an opposing viewpoint." 0
The majority next determined that the St. Paul ordinance
did not fall within any of the three exceptions to content discrimination crafted by the Court."' The Court first rejected the argument that the ordinance's selective regulation was based on the
very reasons that fighting words were proscribable. 112 Justice
Scalia explained that fighting words could be prohibited because
of the intolerable manner of their expression regardless of the
ideas expressed." 13 The Court determined that St. Paul sought
to regulate not an offensive mode of expression, but rather
the particular ideas communicated" t 14 The majority declared
that this intention was enough to make the ordinance
Id.
Id. TheJustice pointed out that the ordinance left unregulated other fighting
words which expressed animus towards, for example, an individual's sexual preference or political beliefs. Id.
108 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508
(1991); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 2547-48. Justice Scalia charged that St. Paul had no authority to favor
one side of a debate regardless of how offensive or distasteful those views may be.
Id. at 2548. The majority, however, indicated that fighting words statutes that are
designed to protect certain groups from direct provocation would be facially valid if
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause were satisfied. Id.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
clause requires that persons similarly situated be treated equally. See NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 12, at § 14.1.
111 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Court-crafted exceptions to content discrimination.
112 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this exception to the prohibition against content discrimination.
113 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
114 Id. at 2549.
106
107
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unconstitutional."15
The majority also dismissed St. Paul's contention that the ordinance's discrimination was aimed specifically at the secondary
effects of hate speech. 1 6 Justice Scalia maintained that the regulation of the emotive impact of hate speech was not a secondary
effect within the meaning of Renton v. Playtime Theaters." 7 Furthermore, because St. Paul's legislation suggested the city's suppression of ideas, the Court concluded that the ordinance did not
fall within the third exception permiting discrimination if there
was no impression that the government was trying to proscribe
certain disfavored ideas." 8
Finally, the majority considered whether the ordinance's
content discrimination could be justified on the ground that it
was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest of protecting the basic human rights of a group subjected to historical discrimination." 9 While conceding that this governmental interest
was compelling, the Court maintained that the threat of censorship, which was presented by a statute clearly based on content,
demanded that the statute be absolutely necessary. 2 ' Citing the
availability of content-neutral alternatives that would achieve the
compelling interest without selectively proscribing fighting
words, the Court declared the ordinance's content discriminatory
provisions invalid.' 2 ' Although emphasizing the Court's distaste
for bias-motivated violence, the majority nevertheless cautioned
122
against using the First Amendment to combat hate speech.
1'5 Id.

116 Id. In rejecting the argument that the ordinance was not directed at hate
speech's secondary effects, the Court relied on Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The Court stated that " '[l]isteners' reactions to speech
are not the type of'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton.' " Id. (quoting Boos,

485 U.S. at 321).
117 Id. (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321). For a discussion of Renton, see supra note
104.
118 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The Court explained that "[tihe statements of St.

Paul in this very case afford ample basis for, if not full confirmation of, that suspicion." Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. (citation omitted). The Court suggested that the only interest served by

the ordinance was to display the city's animosity towards the specific biases
targeted. Id. at 2550. The First Amendment, Justice Scalia postulated, forbid this
type of selectivity. Id.
121 Id.

122 Id. In closing, the Court remarked: "Let there be no mistake about our belief
that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire." Id.
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In a blistering opinion concurring solely in the judgment,
Justice White also deemed the ordinance unconstitutional. 23
The concurring Justice utilized the doctrine of overbreadth, however, and asserted that the regulation was unconstitutional be24
cause it criminalized both unprotected and protected speech.
Although Justice White agreed with the majority that certain
categories of speech could be regulated on the basis of their content,' 2 5 the Justice criticized the majority's finding that such categories were afforded some protection under the First
Amendment. 12 6 Specifically, the Justice attacked the Court for
abandoning the categorical approach under which fighting words
were totally unprotected. 2 7 The Justice criticized the majority
for the apparent inconsistency of holding that the government
could proscribe an entire kind of speech, but not a part of that
same proscribable category.' 28 Under the majority's analysis,
Justice White observed, a state seeking to proscribe specific fighting words would now be required to proscribe all fighting
29
words. 1
123 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (White, J., concurring). Justice White authored an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
joined and in which Justice Stevens joined in part. Id.
124 Id. Justice White initially accused the Court of lacking jurisdiction to decide
the case on the Court's chosen theory because the theory had not been briefed by
the parties or raised in the question presented. Id. at 2550-51 (White, J., concurring). For a detailed discussion of the overbreadth doctrine see supra note 32.
125 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring). See supra notes 7-13 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the categorical approach to regulating
speech.
126 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring). Justice White characterized
the majority as holding "that earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements
that certain categories of expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.' " Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
127 Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 2552-53 (White, J., concurring). Justice White reasoned:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire
category of speech because the content of that speech is evil . . . but
that government may not treat a subset of that category differently
without violating the First Amendment; the content of that subset is
by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.
Id. (citation omitted). The Justice strongly disputed the majority's contention that
"government may not regulate [a mode of speech] based on hostility
or favoritism
towards the underlying message expressed." Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring)
(quoting id. at 2545). Justice White assailed the majority with language from the
main opinion, stating that " 'such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to
First Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence as well.' " Id. (White, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2543).
129 Id. Justice White interpreted the Court's rationale as imposing an underinclusiveness limitation upon a government's ability to regulate proscribable speech. Id.
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In addition, Justice White asserted that the Court's holding
implied that hate speech was of adequate value to outweigh society's interest in order and morality, an interest that traditionally
situated fighting words outside of the First Amendment's protection. 131 Justice White also denounced the Court for granting unprotected categories of expression the same constitutional
protection given to political speech, thus devaluing the latter. 131
Justice White next reminded the Court that the St. Paul ordinance would be constitutional as a content-based regulation if
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. 132 The
Justice charged the majority with renouncing strict scrutiny review by requiring a ban on a wider category of speech than necessary to achieve the city's interest. 133 Although disagreeing with
the Court's reasoning, Justice White nevertheless asserted that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed upon speech protected by the First Amendment.' 34
Justice Blackmun, concurring separately, recognized the unconstitutionality of the St. Paul ordinance but also strongly criticized the majority's reasons for invalidating the law.' 35 The
Justice opined that the Court's decision signalled two disconcerting possibilities for future cases.136 Justice Blackmun first
See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underinclusiveness limitation.
130 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). By recognizing fighting
words as a form of discourse, Justice White expressed that, under the majority's
analysis, hate speech would become a legitimate vehicle for debate. Id. at 2553-54
(White, J., concurring).
'31 Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring) (citing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
1849-50 (1992); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222-23 (1989)).
132 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 112 S.
Ct. 501, 509 (1991)).
133 Id. Justice White explained that, under the Court's holding, a "narrowly
drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider category of
speech." Id. Justice White bolstered this claim, stating that " 'the First Amendment does not require states to regulate for problems that do not exist.' " Id.
(quoting Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856). The Justice next submitted that the St. Paul
ordinance fell within each of the three exceptions to content discrimination crafted
by the Court. Id. at 2556-58 (White, J., concurring). See supra notes 102-18 and
accompanying text for a listing and discussion of these exceptions.
134 Id. at 2558, 2560 (White, J., concurring). Justice White ended his concurrence by pontificating that the "decision is mischievous at best and will surely confuse the lower courts. I join the judgment, but not the folly of the opinion." Id. at
2560 (White, J., concurring).
135 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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prognosticated that the majority's ruling could weaken the categorical approach and inevitably lead to a lower standard of review for all content-based laws.' 3 7 The Justice explained that
First Amendment protections would generally deteriorate if all
expression was accorded the same protection. 13 8 Alternatively,
the Justice predicted that the Court's decision would be regarded
as an anomaly carrying no precedential weight. 3 9 Although Justice Blackmun argued that the First Amendment did not prevent
a government from prohibiting particular race-based fighting
words, the Justice nevertheless found the St. Paul ordinance fatally overbroad. 40
Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence, also concluded
4
that the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad.' '
Justice Stevens rejected the Court's "content neutrality" approach to the St. Paul ordinance, however, and strongly disputed
the Court's assertion that content-based regulations were presumptively invalid.' 42 By prohibiting the content-based regula137 Id. Justice Blackmun submitted that the "simple reality is that the Court will
never provide child pornography or cigarette advertising the level of protection
customarily granted political speech. If we are forbidden from categorizing, as the
Court has done here, we shall reduce protection across the board." Id.

138

Id.

Id. at 2560-61 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Blackmun expressed his apprehension that the majority "had been distracted from its proper mission by the
temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' neither of which is presented here." Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
For an explanation of "political correctness" see Politically Correct, WALL ST. J., Nov.
26, 1990, at 10A, col. 1 (explaining that Political Correctness requires " 'right'
opinions about women, sexism, race and numerous other categories of victimology"); D'SOUZA, supra note 2, at 239 (discussing the trend of "political correctness" on campuses).
140 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring). By way of epilogue,
Justice Blackmun pronounced:
I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that
prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by
burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the
people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community.
Id. See supra note 32 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.
141 Id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justices White and Blackmun joined in part. Id.
142 Id. Justice Stevens initially characterized the majority's rationale as "an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland." Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring). Opposing the idea that content-based regulations were presumptively invalid, the Justice
argued that "much of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on
the assumption that content makes a difference." Id. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also noted that "content-based distinctions, far from being
presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent understanding of the First Amendment." Id.
139
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tion of traditionally unprotected categories of speech, Justice
Stevens averred that the majority's
decision subverted basic First
3
Amendment principles.14

Justice Stevens also expressed reservations with Justice
White's "categorical approach," which found fighting words to
be totally unprotected by the First Amendment.144 The categorical approach, Justice Stevens declared, sacrificed "subtlety for
clarity" and was "ultimately unsound" in attempting to categorize all expression.145 Moreover, the Justice criticized the "categorical approach" as flawed in dealing with questions of
context. 146 Justice Stevens explained that this "all-or-nothing approach" afforded expression either enormous First Amendment
47
protection or none at all.'
As an alternative to the approaches of the majority and Justice White, Justice Stevens proffered "a more complex and subtle
analysis" that included both the "nature and scope" of the regulation and the "content and the context" of the expression. 148
Using these factors, the Justice declared that had the St. Paul ordinance not been overbroad, it would have been constitutional
had it not been overbroad because it regulated expression based
on the harm the speech caused rather than the subject matter or
143 Id. at 2562-63 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens bolstered this claim
by referencing Young v. American Mini-Theaters, in which the Court validated zoning
regulations placed on movie theaters "based on the content of the films shown,"
and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, in which the Court "upheld a restriction on the
broadcast of specific indecent words." Id. at 2563-64 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (plurality opinion);
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
Justice Stevens additionally posited that by forbidding content-based regulation of fighting words the Court provided such expression the same protection
given to "core political speech." Id. at 2564 n.4 (Stevens,J., concurring). The Justice further asserted that the majority's exceptions to the prohibition against content discrimination undermined its conclusion that the law was unconstitutional.
Id. at 2565-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145 Id. (citation omitted).
146 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens,J, concurring). Justice Stevens postulated
that efforts at categorization lead only to "fuzzy boundaries" as illustrated by the
Court's wavering over definitions of obscenity and public forum. Id. (citations
omitted).
147 Id. at 2566-67 (Stevens, J., concurring). The meaning of expression and the
constitutionality of its regulation, Justice Stevens stressed, may only be determined
by considering both content and context. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982)).
148 Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concluded that the categorical approach presented an inadequate response to the majority's novel content
neutrality analysis. Id.
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viewpoint it addressed.14 9 Justice Stevens reasoned that the St.
Paul ordinance proscribed only a subclass of expression that
caused injury based on racial, religious or gender bigotry, not
expression discussing those characteristics.15
In R.A. V, the majority aptly preserved the sanctity of the
First Amendment by holding the government to a standard of
neutrality when regulating hateful expression.' 5 ' In so doing,
the majority properly demonstrated a predilection towards protecting the greatest amount of expression, even expression discomforting to the addressee.' 5 2 Although the Court's decision
eviscerates the strict categorical application of the First Amendment, the fighting words doctrine retains its validity, provided
that a statute is content neutral and does not impinge upon constitutionally protected speech. 153

154
The majority's opinion, however, is not without flaw.

Id. In reviewing the constitutionality of content-based regulations, Justice
Stevens noted that the Court has considered a number of factors including: (1) the
content and character of the expressive activity; (2) context; (3) "the nature of a
contested restriction of speech;" and (4) the scope of the regulations. Id. at 256769 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 2570 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concluded by reiterating
that the ordinance's regulation of hate speech was based on the different harms
caused by such expression and not because of its particular subject matter or viewpoint. Id. In support, Justice Stevens referred to the Los Angeles riots lamenting
that "[o]ne need look no further than the recent social unrest in the Nation's cities
to see that race-based threats may cause more harm to society and to individuals
than other threats." Id. at 2570 n.9 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens maintained that "until the Nation matures beyond that condition, laws such as St. Paul's
ordinance will remain reasonable and justifiable." Id.
151 See supra note 4 and accompanying text for an explanation of content neutrality. See also Leo, supra note 26, at 25.
152 See Linda Greenhouse, The Court's 2 Visions of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1992, at A13 (stating that the R.A. V. decision was a "declaration in favor of more
speech rather than less, even if the speech sometimes carries a painfully high
price"). Historically, the Court has contended that free speech often served its
highest function when it "induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
153 See Gard, supra note 18, at 564 (noting that at the state level "one finds an
extraordinary number of cases invoking the [fighting words] doctrine").
154 For the concurring Justices' critique of the majority's opinion, see supra notes
123-50 and accompanying text. See also Greenhouse, supra note 152, at A13 ("In
expanding the freedom of speech, this decision, in its tone of arid absolutism, may
have made freedom more painful to bear.").
One scholar has criticized the Court for failing to consider the possible application of the reconstruction amendments to hate crimes. Akhil R. Amar, The Case of
the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 126
(1992). Professor Amar argues that
none of the Justices forcefully framed and engaged in the most diffi149
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R.A. V has left many more questions than answers with regard to
the decision's future scope.' 55 While the majority's decision directly deals with a statute that made certain expression itself a
crime, it also calls into doubt the constitutionality of statutes that
increase sentences for physical attacks that are prompted by race,
religion, gender or other motives.' 56 The R.A. V decision similarly casts doubt upon the constitutionality of campus speech
codes,' 5 7 as well as hostile work environment laws which, like
cult question hiding behind R.A. V.: whether, and under what circumstances, words such as "nigger" and symbols such as burning crosses
cease to be part of the freedom of speech protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and instead constitute badges of servitude
that may be prohibited under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id.
155 See, e.g., Terry Tang, Muddying the Legal Waters-At Odds: The U.S. and Its
Court-As Positions Shift, Ideological Balance Remains Uneasy, SEATrLE TIMES, July 5,
1992, at All ("Whether R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul will become an important case in
First Amendment interpretation is unknown. Its implications are so broad and difficult to reconcile with earlier cases involving 'fighting words' that it may be regarded by future courts as an aberration.").
156 See Leo, supra note 26, at 25. Following the R.A. V. decision, "the law cannot
single out any special categories of potential victims for special attention ....
This
could mean wider uncertainty about what constitutes an offense and perhaps more
power for the courts, which may end up making the content-based decisions that
legislators are now forbidden to make." Id. Moreover, the R.A. V. decision could
also challenge the validity of bias crime laws with "enhanced" penalties "if it seems
that thought or expression, and not just action, is being punished." Id.
Recently, the Oregon and Wisconsin Supreme Courts considered the constitutionality of their states' anti-hate legislation in light of the R.A. V decision. See Oregon v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 560 (Or. 1992) (declaring a statute making it a
crime for two or more persons to injure another "because of their perception of
that person's race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation" did not
violate the First Amendment); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811, 814 (Wis.)
(holding that a statute that enhanced punishment for certain crimes if the victim
was selected because of race violated the First Amendment), cert. granted sub nom.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court has recently issued conflicting opinions regarding the constitutionality of New Jersey's anti-hate law that imposes
stronger penalties for bias-motivated crimes. Russ Bleemer, Bias Crime Law Survives
First Challenge, N.J.L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 14 (citing State v. Mortimer (Indictment
No. 1-1869-11-91) (holding unconstitutional New Jersey's hate crime statute that
increases sentences for bias-motivated crimes); State v. Sharkey (Indictment No.
91-11-1230) (upholding as constitutional NewJersey statute which imposes stiffer
penalties for bias-motivated crimes)). See generally Iver Peterson, Hate Law is Reected
by a Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1992, at B26 ("the [Mortimer] ruling makes New
Jersey the latest state to run into trouble because of efforts to construe hate speech
as a form of illegal conduct").
157 See Leo, supra note 26, at 25 ("Since most college speech codes depend on a
similar laundry list of offense categories, they are presumably in as much trouble as
ordinances like St. Paul's."). For an additional discussion of college speech codes,
see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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the St. Paul ordinance, proscribe only certain forms of
58
harassment. 1
The positions taken by Justices White and Stevens are, however, even more troubling.' 5 9 Justice White's declaration that the
types of speech within the categorical exceptions to the First
Amendment were totally unprotected inadequately considers the
complex nature of speech.' 60 Expression varies greatly and efforts to categorize it have produced ad hoc results and murky
classifications of speech.16
While Justice Stevens properly recognized the categorical
approach's inherent problems, the "complex and subtle" analysis
based on the content, context, nature and scope of the regulated
speech is no more satisfying. Under this nebulous standard, governments would be uncertain as to what expression they could
constitutionally proscribe. In practical operation, Justice Stevens's approach would merely transfer the power to decide what
expression is protected from the legislature to the judiciary. 6 2
Understandably, the concurring Justices were emotionally
moved by the harmful effects of racism and the worthy goals of
the St. Paul ordinance. The Justices, however, overlooked the
1 63
importance of protecting even unpopular or offensive speech.
The majority's emphasis on content neutrality affords greater
protection against improper government regulation of expression than do the concurring opinions.""4 Under the content neu158 See Cole, supra note 19, at 30. Justice Scalia, however, maintained that these
regulations were constitutional because they were directed more at conduct than
expression. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
159 See Michael W. McConnell, The PC Left Makes a Right, N.J.L.J., Aug. 24, 1992,

at supp. 26 (stating that "the two concurrences do a much better job of exposing
weaknesses in the majority and in each other than they do in making an affirmative
case of their preferred approach").
160 See R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that "[flew
dividing lines in First Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at
categorization inevitably give rise only to fuzzy boundaries").
161 See id.
162 See McConnell, supra note 159, supp. at 26.

163 See supra notes 4-5. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, (1927), cautioned that:
[The founders] knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable governments; that the

path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
164 See McConnell, supra note 159, supp. at 26 (positing that "the majority opin-
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trality rule, government may not selectively proscribe even a
subclass of a wholly proscribable category of speech on the basis
of content. This approach should provide governments with a
reasonably clear constitutional standard for regulating expres1 65
sion and lead to more predictable results.
Nevertheless, government should not be in the business of
prohibiting hate speech. Besides violating the First Amendment,
hate crime laws raise other legal and moral problems. Anti-hate
laws seek legislative solutions to fundamental, albeit unattractive,
human emotions. 66 Proponents of these laws fail to recognize
that government lacks the ability to eliminate racist or hateful
beliefs.' 67
1
Hate and racism are sins, not crimes.16 8 States that impose
anti-hate laws unfortunately will fare no better in eradicating
these retrograde views from our midst than have our centuriesold theological doctrines. Nevertheless, it is imperative that bigots not view the majority's decision as protecting or condoning
racist or hateful acts. Although R.A.V. may not be prosecuted
under the St. Paul hate crime ordinance, he and bigots like him
69
should be tried under other existing criminal laws.'
Thomas S. McGuire
ion seems to offer the most comprehensive and coherent protection for freedom of
speech against the dangers of official orthodoxy").
165 A general fighting words statute which includes racial, religious, or genderbased epithets would probably meet First Amendment review, if content neutral.
See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545. Under the majority rationale, a government may
proscribe fighting words directed at specific groups if the regulations are content
neutral and pass equal protection scrutiny. Id. at 2548.
166 See William Murchinson, Society Shouldn't Try to Outlaw Hatred, TEX. LAw. July
13, 1992, at 12. Murchinson commented:
What is worst maybe about "hate crime" statutes is that they attempt
too much. We imagine that every problem has a legislative or juridical solution, when the reality is that only a few, highly basic human
problems can be addressed in this way. Laws, thoughtlessly considered, carelessly applied, only inflame the winner to vaunt his winnings, the loser to nourish his resentments.
Id.
167 See id. ("We have assigned the law a task too big for it-the reconciliation of
social conflicts. Courts, legislatures, city councils and college administrations
(which have enacted similar codes) are in way over their heads.").
168 See id. (opining that "you don't need better laws" regulating hate expression
but "better theology").
169 See supra note 30 and accompanying text for other laws already existing which
can punish the actor in a hate crime.

